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Abstract
We study individual decision making in a lottery-choice task performed by three different populations: gamblers under
psychological treatment ("addicts"), gamblers’ spouses ("victims"), and people who are neither gamblers or gamblers’
spouses ("normals"). We find that addicts are willing to take less risk than normals, but the difference is smaller as a
gambler’s time under treatment increases. The large majority of victims report themselves unwilling to take any risk at
all. However, addicts in the first year of treatment react more than other addicts to the different values of the risk-return
parameter.
Keywords: risky decision making, pathological gambling, attraction and repulsion to chance.
1 Introduction
Since the late 1940s, individual decision making under
risk has been one of the most popular issues studied by
economists and psychologists. On one hand, theoreti-
cal analysis, initially undertaken mostly by economists,
has framed the basic problem as a generic situation in
which individuals choose from a number of probability-
outcome pairs. On the other hand, empirical contribu-
tions from both disciplines have adopted a variety of
methodologies. These include questionnaires, economic
experiments, and real-world data. The most salient and
intriguing result across all these different methodologies
is that decisions in a risky environment are very sensitive
to the framing of the choice task and to some individ-
ual characteristics. In this paper, we focus on the effects
of problem gambling on individual choice under uncer-
tainty, as a natural field for studying interaction between
subjects’ characteristics and their observed decision mak-
ing behavior.
Since 1980, pathological gambling has been included
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in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders published by the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation (1980). Patients with spectrum-related disorders
show an intense desire to perform a specific behavior
preceded by unpleasant feelings and physiological acti-
vation, all of which are relieved when the behavior is per-
formed (Cartwright et al., 1998). Thus, several authors
consider pathological gambling (PG) as an obsessive-
compulsive spectrum disorder (Frost, 2001 ). Contrary
to this view, other authors argue that gambling is essen-
tially egosyntonic for the patients in all phases of the
disorder, in contrast to what happens in the obsessive-
compulsive spectrum disorders, where the behavior is
consistently egodystonic (American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, 1994). Moreover, compulsive behaviors include
increased evasive behavior, anticipatory anxiety and risk
aversion, which are not usually observed in the behavior
of pathological gamblers (PGs).
This lack of agreement among experts on whether
gambling is an egosyntonic or egodystonic disorder could
even imply that gamblers may be heterogeneous with re-
spect to their attitudes towards their addiction. Therefore,
at a first stage, whether gambling is an egosyntonic or
egodystonic disorder would influence the way PGs feel
about their condition. At a second stage, this could in-
terfere with the degree to which they feel more attracted
than normal subjects by bets involving riskier options.
Therefore, studying whether PGs behave differently from
normal subjects in risky decision-making tasks would re-
quire isolating the first level of pleasure or discomfort due
to being a gambler from the second level of pleasure due
to betting on riskier options. A natural way of obtain-
ing a more homogeneous population of gamblers with re-
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spect to their attitude towards their addiction is isolating
and studying a population of egodystonic gamblers as are
those who have voluntarily decided to quit and participate
in a Gambler Anonymous (GA) therapy group.
Several aspects of PGs’ behavior have been studied so
far. Such studies are either aimed at shedding light on
specific methodological issues that should be accounted
for when studying decision making by PGs1 or are di-
rectly addressing the question whether PGs suffer form
some kind of cognitive bias. Among different kinds of
cognitive bias, the most obvious suspect is probability
distortion due to attraction to risky bets, which could
yield irrational behavior reflected on higher degrees of
risk taking as compared to normal subjects. Along this
line are the studies by Toneatto (1999a,b), Gaboury and
Ladouceur (1989) and, especially, Leopard (1978), while
Goodie (2005) adopts a slightly different approach to
higher levels of risk taking showing that they are the re-
sult of overconfidence.
In this paper, we study risky decisions made by sub-
jects whose lives have been directly affected by patho-
logical gambling and have decided to quit by participat-
ing in a therapy group of GA. Furthermore, we study the
risk taking behavior of people who are indirectly affected
by pathological gambling because they are married to a
pathological gambler. We want to know whether the deci-
sions of the aforementioned groups in an abstract lottery-
choice task significantly differ from those taken by “nor-
mal” subjects and, if so, in what way. In order to ad-
dress this question, 82 subjects played a hypothetical ver-
sion of the lottery-choice task introduced by Sabater &
Georgantzís (2002) and further developed and discussed
in Georgantzís et al. (2004). The task is designed to cap-
ture two dimensions of decision making under risk. First,
it can be used to distinguish between risk-averse and risk-
neutral/risk-loving subjects. It also measures an individ-
ual’s degree of risk aversion. Second, the task captures a
subject’s reaction to different risk premia.
Our sample consists of three different subsamples. The
first, labeled ADDICTS, consists of 32 PGs attending a
Gambler Anonymous (GA) session at the Annual Meet-
ing of the Cordobesian Association for Patholical Gam-
blers (ACOJER)2. The second subsample, labeled VIC-
TIMS3, consists of 30 spouses of subjects from the first
subsample. The third subsample consists of 20 sub-
1For example, Ladouceur et al. (2007) show that gamblers exhibit
an increased willingness to participate in studies on gambling.
2At the moment of the experiment, they were heterogeneous with
respect to their times under psychological treatment: 15 of them were
in their “first year” under treatment; 4 were in the second year; 2 in the
third year; 5 of them in the 5th; 2 in the 6th year; 2 in the 7th year and
2 had been under treatment for over 10 years.
3We call gamblers’ spouses “victims” because they are the ones who
have suffered the negative consequences of pathological gambling with-
out having a gambling problem themselves.
jects which are our control population, labeled NOR-
MALS. Sabater & Georgantzís (2002) and Georgantzís
et al. (2004) provide us with a much larger data set ob-
tained with normal student-subjects faced with the same
task under different payment methods. However, given
the age difference between students and our two focus
groups, we have created this new sample of normal sub-
jects for the sake of comparability.
Our results show that addicts exhibit a higher degree
of risk aversion than normal individuals, although their
behavior tends to convergence towards normals’ decision
making behavior as the time under treatment increases.
Interestingly, victims are even more risk-averse. In fact,
a large percentage of them (around 70%) refused to take
any risk at all.
A second salient result is that addicts in the first year
of treatment appear to be more sensitive to risk-rewarding
increases in expected rewards than are all other subjects.
In Section 2, we further discuss our objectives and hy-
pothesis. In Section 3, we explain the experimental de-
sign. Section 4 summarizes the results and Section 5 con-
tains the conclusions. The appendix presents an English
translation of the instructions.
2 Hypotheses
There are few precedents for experimental economics re-
search on “special subject pools.” For instance, Battalio
et al. (1973) report the results of a token economy ex-
periment run with 38 patients of the Central Islip State
Hospital. More recently, Bosch-Doménech et al. (2005)
conducted research with Alzheimer patients, and Ernst
Fehr has reported currently ongoing experiments with
schizophrenics. Contrary to economists, psychologists
have extensively studied cognitive distortions related to
pathological gambling (for example, Toneatto (1999a,b),
or Gaboury and Ladouceur (1989). These findings moti-
vate our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Addicts’ attitudes towards risk are sig-
nificantly different from those of normal subjects.
We formulate the first hypothesis in this generic form,
because the difference could go in either direction. One
possibility is that gambling tasks are sensitive to the un-
derlying attraction that addicts have toward gambling.
This is possible because the task itself does not involve
real money and is thus different from the compulsive be-
havior that the addicts are trying to overcome. The other
possibility is that the addicts’ new aversion toward gam-
bling will extend to the laboratory task. Thus, the way we
address this question concerns whether laboratory gam-
bling tasks are sensitive to basic impulses which are pre-
sumably still present, or to PGs’ reflective commitment
to give up gambling.
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It is not clear how victims should be expected to be-
have towards risk. On one hand they are people who have
not been diagnosed as PGs. So, ex-ante, their behavior
could be expected to be indistinguishable from normals.
On the other hand, the evidence reported by Darbyshire
(2001) concerning children’s behavior living in a family
where parental gambling is a problem suggest that indi-
rect effects may also affect the behavior of spouses. This
motivates the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Victims behave in a significantly differ-
ent way towards risk as compared to addicts and to nor-
mals.
3 Experimental design
Our main objective is to explore the direct and indirect
effects of pathological gambling on risk attitudes. We
compare three different subsamples: addicts, victims, and
normals.
Our data on the two main groups were collected from a
single experimental session at Hotel El Pilar in La Carlota
(Córdoba, Spain) in November 2003. The subject pool
in this session consisted of members of the “Asociación
Cordobesa de Jugadores en Rehabilitación” (ACOJER)
during their annual meeting. This is an association dedi-
cated to the psychological treatment of PGs. We ran two
treatments in this session:
i. In the first (addicts) treatment, all the subjects were
compulsive gamblers belonging to the aforemen-
tioned GA group. Thirty-three people participated
in the addicts treatment. Nevertheless, we gathered
only 32 independent observations because one sub-
ject refused to play the game at all.
ii. In the second (victims) treatment, subjects were play-
ers’ spouses and, thus, victims of their compulsive
behavior. We gathered 30 independent observations
under the victims treatment.
iii. We compare the results obtained from these two sub-
ject populations to those obtained from another ex-
perimental session run with normal subjects at the
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (CSIC).
This is a research center which is also located in
Córdoba. We made a public announcement for a
hypothetical experiment and we recruited 20 volun-
teers among the administrative staff. This subsam-
ple was preferred over college students because of
demographic similarities (age, geographic origins,
etc.) to the other two subsamples. Table 1 presents
descriptives on the composition of the three subsam-
ples in terms of gender and age.
Table 1: Demographic Data
VICTIMS ADDICTS NORMALS
AGE (YEARS) 41.2 42.06 33.35
MALE (%) 13.3% 90.6% 60%
n 32 30 20
In our experiment, no subject received any monetary
or other real reward. Subjects made decisions about
probabilities of earning hypothetical money. This pro-
cedure was followed for ethical reasons: medical proto-
cols advise against offering real rewards in gambling sit-
uations to individuals recovering from pathological gam-
bling (see, for instance, Stinchfield, 2003) because absti-
nence from gambling is the ultimate goal of the treatment.
For the sake of comparability, the hypothetical framing
was also used in the case of the other two subsamples.
Our instructions stressed that we were not asking for
names and therefore that the experimental results were
going to be analyzed in a completely anonymous way.
Moreover, in order to avoid any Experimenter effect, we
were introduced as scientists performing an anonymous
socio-economic academic research for scientific purposes
rather than a medical one.
Note that there is a higher proportion of males in the
addicts sample than in the other two subsamples. Some
studies indicate that males are less risk averse than fe-
males (see Harris et al. (2006) for financial risk; García-
Gallego et al. (2006) for a task similar to the one used
here; also, Olsen & Cox (2001), and Byrnes et al. (1999)
and the recent review by Eckel & Grossman, in press).
So, this might introduce a bias in the comparison be-
tween addicts and normals, making addicts less risk-
averse. Victims are mostly women. In this case, the pos-
sible bias would favor a less risky behavior by the victims.
Our experimental design is based on the following
slightly revised version of the ternary lotteries approach
(see Roth & Malouf, 1979, or Murningham et al. 1988,
for example).
Let a lottery (p,X) imply a probability p of earning
X (else nothing). Consider a continuum of such lotteries
constructed to compensate riskier options with increases
in the expected payoff. Formally, each continuum of lot-
teries will be defined by the pair (c, r) corresponding, re-
spectively, to the certain payoff c above which the ex-
pected payoff is increases by r times the probability of
earning nothing. Therefore,
pX(p) = c+ (1− p)r =⇒ X(p) = c+ (1− p)r
p
.
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Panel 1
P 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Xpuntos 1.00 1.12 1.27 1.47 1.73 2.10 2.65 3.56 5.40 10.90
Preferencia
Panel 2
P 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Xpuntos 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.90 2.30 3.00 4.00 5.70 9.00 19.00
Preferencia
Panel 3
P 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Xpuntos 1.00 1.66 2.50 3.57 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 55.00
Preferencia
Panel 4
P 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Xpuntos 1.00 2.20 3.80 5.70 8.30 12.00 17.50 26.70 45.00 100.00
Preferencia
Figure 1: Lottery Panels
In order to simplify the decision problem faced by our
subjects, we used lottery panels. Each panel corresponds
to a discrete version of a continuum of lotteries for a dif-
ferent r. Figure 1 presents the four panels used in this
study. In the second row of each panel we present the
payoffs (Xpuntos, expressed in Euros) corresponding to
the favorable outcome of each lottery which occurs with
probability p. Such probabilities are given in the first row.
The third row (Preferencia) consists of empty cells,
one of which should be used by each subject to mark
his or her preference (see a translation of the instructions
in the Appendix). These panels were constructed using
c = 1 and r = 0.1, 1, 5, 10.
By inspection, the farther right the lottery chosen by
a subject, the less risk-averse the subject is. Risk-neutral
(or risk-loving) subjects would choose p = 0.1 in all pan-
els. In fact, as shown in Georgantzís et al. (2004), an ex-
pected utility maximizing subject with utility U(X) =
X1/t would choose the lottery with a winning probabil-
ity p = (1− 1t ) · (1 + cr ), while a Constant Relative Risk
Aversion utility maximizer with U(X) = X
1−t
1−t would
choose p = ctr + t. Apart from guaranteeing that the
probabilities chosen in the task relate monotonically to a
subject’s risk aversion parameter, these predictions imply
that a subject should choose riskier lotteries as we move
from panel 1 to panel 4. These predictions also hold for
other well-known utility functions like those exhibiting
Constant Relative Risk Aversion and Constant Absolute
Table 2: Between-subject analysis.
Panel
A. 1 2 3 4
KRUSKAL-W χ2 . 15.48 27.62 30.74 29.87
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MEDIAN χ2 16.82 25.31 34.00 35.20
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B.
Addicts vs. Victims -3.34 -3.58 -3.82 -3.61
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Victims vs. Normals -3.52 -5.15 -5.36 -5.29
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Addicts vs. Normals -0.38 -1.98 -2.08 -2.23
p− value 0.70 0.04 0.03 0.02
Risk Aversion.4
4However, there are many alternative approaches which could ex-
plain our subjects’ choices as attraction to some prominent payof (Al-
bers & Albers, 1983), a subject’s need to take some optimal degree
of risk (Pope, 1998; 2000) or the result of some heuristic (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982) whose exhaustive review is beyond the scope of this
article.
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a: Panel 1 b: Panel 2
c: Panel 3 d: Panel 4
Figure 2: Cumulative Frequency of Choices per Lottery Panel; A: Addicts, V: Victims, N: Normals.
4 Results
4.1 Differences in risk attitudes
First, we compare behavior across subject subsamples.
Figures 2a-d present cumulative frequencies of choices
by subject subsample. Each figure presents choices per
lottery panel. The horizontal axis represents p, which is
the winning probability of a subject’s preferred lottery.
Notice that lotteries are then ordered in the figures start-
ing by the riskiest and finishing with the certain outcome.
The vertical axis represents the cumulative frequency of
choices. We can see how a very high percentage of vic-
tims (dashed line with black dots) prefer the safe option
(p = 1) regardless of the panel.
We can see that the baseline population (normal sub-
jects, continuous line) is the riskiest (see, for example,
the high percentage of people choosing p = 0.1). Finally,
in all panels, the behavior of addicts (dashed line with
square markers) lies between the behavior of the other
two samples.
We can check, now, whether results are statistically dif-
ferent across subsamples in each panel, based on a series
of Kruskal-Wallis and Median non-parametric tests for
k = 3 unrelated samples. The null hypothesis is that the
average (or the median) is the same in all the three sub-
samples (victims, addicts and normals). We perform the
same analysis in each panel. Table 2 summarizes these
tests.
Both series of tests yield identical results: samples are
not drawn from the same population. Neither the average
nor the median can be considered invariant across sub-
ject populations in any lottery panel. Each group’s be-
havior statistically differs from the other two subsamples’
choices. A series of Mann Whitney non-parametric tests
for k = 2 unpaired samples report a similar message:
with the exception of the comparison between addicts and
normals in panel 1 (where the risk-premium trade off is
very low) the remaining cases show differences among
populations.5 Moreover in all the comparisons where vic-
tims are involved we see that test are always significant
differences for any value of α. Table 2b shows this series
of tests (the p− value is shown between brackets):
Looking at each population’s average choice across
panels (victims = 0.867, addicts = 0.560 and normals
= 0.385), we get that:
Result 1a: Addicts choose safer options than normal
individuals, and:
Result 1b: The large majority of victims report them-
selves unwilling to take any risk at all.
5A series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (non reported here) indicate
identical results.
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a: Victims
b: Addicts
c: Normals
Figure 3: Choice differences across panels for Victims,
Addicts & Normals (Cum. Freq.)
4.2 Behavior across panels
Now we explore within-subject behavior across lotteries.
Figures, 3a-c show cumulative distributions across pan-
els for each subsample. Again, the horizontal axis rep-
resents the winning probabilities of the lotteries chosen
(p), starting by the riskiest option and finishing with the
sure outcome. The vertical axis represents the cumulative
frequency. Here we can observe how behavior does not
seem to significantly vary across panels for victims (3-
a) and addicts (3-b) while normals (3-c) seem to behave
differently across lottery panels.
Formal tests can be used to support these findings in-
forming us on the extent to which subjects within each
subsample are sensitive to increases of the risk-return pa-
rameter as we move from panel 1 to panel 4.
VICTIMS: Clearly, we do not observe any variation
across panels; on average their choices are 0.85 (panel
1, hereafter p1), 0.89 (p2), 0.87 (p3) and 0.86 (p4).
Both the Friedman (χ23 = 2.65; p = 0.44) and Kendall
(χ23 = 2.65; p = 0.44) tests for k = 4 related samples do
not reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions.
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all samples are
drawn from the same population. Hence, victims do not
react to the 4 different values of the risk-return parameter
used to construct the four panels.
ADDICTS: The invariant average behavior observed in
the previous group is also observed among addicts. The
average behavior does not vary across panels: 0.59 (p1),
0.59 (p2), 0.53 (p3) and 0.53 (p4). Both the Friedman
(χ23 = 2.62; p = 0.45) and Kendall (χ
2
3 = 2.62; p =
0.45) tests do not reject the null hypothesis. Hence, ad-
dicts did not vary their behavior across panels.
NORMALS: In contrast to the other samples, our base-
line population reacted to the risk-return trade-off in the
expected way, choosing riskier lotteries as we move from
panel 1 to panel 4. In the first panel (mean choice = 0.52)
they behaved similarly to addicts. However, they varied
their choices when they were faced with higher values of
the risk-return parameter. Therefore, in panels 2, 3 and
4 choice averages clearly fall: 0, 38 (p2), 0, 33 (p3) and
0, 30 (p4). In contrast to what we reported above on vic-
tims and addicts, both the Friedman (χ23 = 8.84; p =
0.03) and Kendall (χ23 = 8.84; p = 0.03) tests reject the
null hypothesis. Thus, normal subjects do vary their be-
havior across panels.6
In a separate analysis, we defined premium sensitiv-
ity as the slope of the best fitting line when choice was
plotted against panel (counting panels 1–4 as equally
spaced). A higher slope indicates a willingness to take
more risk when the premium for risk taking was higher.
Premium sensitivity did not depend on age, sex, or on
overall risk attitude. It did, however, differ significantly
among the three groups by a simple analysis of variance
(F2,79 = 4.60, p = .013). Mean slopes (change in re-
sponse for each step from one panel to the next) were
0.000 for victims, 0.023 for addicts, 0.070 for normals.
6A more detailed examination of this finding concerning normal
subjects can clarify the origin of the difference across lottery panels.
As we move from panel 1 to the following panels, significant differ-
ences appear [Z-Wilcoxon tests for p1 vs. p2: −1.97 (p = 0.04); p1
vs. p3: −2.24 (p = 0.02); p1 vs. p4: −2.52 (p = 0.01)]. However,
the same test fails to find any difference for the remaining comparisons
[Z-Wilcoxon tests for p2 vs. p3: −1.26 (p = 0.20); p3 vs. p4: −0.59
(p = 0.55); p2 vs. p4: −1.64 (p = 0.10)]. That is, subjects are
sensitive only to large increases in the risk-return parameter.
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Post-hoc examination of the three pairs of groups showed
a significant difference only between victims and normals
(F1,48 = 10.45, p = .007, with Bonferroni correction).
Addicts were in between, with somewhat greater pre-
mium sensitivity (but not quite significantly in this anal-
ysis) for those in the first year of treatment than those in
later years. (We discuss time in treatment further, below.)
We summarize the preceding remarks as follows:
Result 2a: Both addicts and victims tend to maintain
their choices invariant across different scenarios of the
risk-return parameter.
Result 2b: Normal subjects’ choices are sensitive to
large risk-return variations, and the normal subjects differ
significantly from the victims.
4.3 Effect of time in treatment
Figure 4 presents cumulative frequencies by panel of
choices by PGs, distinguishing between those who are
in their first year of treatment and those who have un-
dergone treatment for longer periods. A more detailed
analysis of the time under treatment variable would be
desirable, but attempting this in our study would lead to
excessively small subsamples for each year. Therefore,
both here and in the statistical model below we adopt the
dichotomous treatment of the variable.
However, it is also true that the first year of treatment
is certainly special and, as we will see, a significant effect
of the first year dummy is observed.7 Figure 5 presents
the same data in a way which allows us to observe the
reaction of each type of PG to the different values of the
risk return parameter which were used to construct the
four panels. The risky decision making behavior of PGs
in the first year of treatment exhibits two major differ-
ences with respect to the behavior of PGs under longer
treatment periods: First, the former make safer options,
especially avoiding lotteries involving the riskiest bets.
Second, while the behavior of all other subjects remains
largely invariant in the presence of higher risk-return pa-
rameters, PGs in the first year of treatment are strongly
attracted by higher values of the risk-return parameter.
4.4 Overall analysis of individual differ-
ences
Finally, we study in a quantitative way the determinants
of individual decisions across the four panels. The es-
timation results reported in Table 3 refer to a model in
which pij is subject i’s choice in panel j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
7However a set of non-parametric Mann–Whitney test do not report
clear differences: panel 1 (Z = −1.26; p = 0.23), panel 2 (Z =
−1.23; p = 0.23), panel 3 (Z = −0.90; p = 0.39), panel 4 (Z =
−0.23; p = 0.82). The largest differences are observed in panels 1 and
2 however these differences disappear for panels 3 and 4.
Figure 4: Panels 1–4. Comparison between PGs in the
first year of treatment and PGs under longer treatment
periods (Cum. Freq.).
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Table 3: Individual Behavior Model. Dependent Variable: pij (i’s choice in panel j)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.443966 0.034378 12.91430 0.0000
PREMIUM -0.004405 0.003738 -1.178490 0.2395
FIRST 0.107583 0.050234 2.141624 0.0330
MALE -0.073739 0.013846 -5.325516 0.0000
GA 0.149497 0.046938 3.184985 0.0016
VICTIM 0.470210 0.040997 11.46942 0.0000
R2 = 0.365123 R
2
= 0.355265 S.E. of Regression = 0.2835 F-statistic = 37.03698 Prob(F-statistic) = 0.00000
The independent variables used are: a constant, C; the
risk premium rj used to construct panel j; a FIRST
dummy taking the value 1 for gamblers under the first
year of treatment and 0 otherwise; a MALE dummy tak-
ing the value 1 for male subjects and 0 for female ones;
GA is a dummy taking the value 1 for gamblers un-
der treatment and 0 otherwise; and finally, a VICTIM
dummy.
It is interesting to note that FIRST separates gamblers
under the first year of treatment from both normal sub-
jects and gamblers under longer treatment periods, as
well as from victims. This is inspired by the preceding
discussion of figures 4 and 5, according to which PGs
under the first year of treatment are those whose behavior
differs most from that of normal subjects. The regression
results confirm that gamblers under the first year of treat-
ment make safer options than other subjects. Therefore,
PGs under longer periods of participation in GA sessions
are not so different from normal subjects.8
The remaining parameter estimates suggest that sub-
jects who are indirectly affected by gambling (victims)
are willing to take fewer risks than all other subjects.
Also, as reported in most previous studies on gender dif-
ferences in risky choice, males are willing to take more
risk than females.
Finally, when all observations are pooled together, sub-
jects exhibit limited attraction (although on the expected
direction) by higher returns to risk. This finding contrasts
with what was observed on Figure 5 above concerning
the behavior of PGs in the first year of treatment, exhibit-
ing a strong reaction to higher risk-return parameters. It
also contrasts with our finding reported in Result 2b con-
cerning normal subjects’ attraction by large risk-return
parameters.9
8For instance, in panel 1, a Mann-Whitney test for differences be-
tween normal subjects and PG’s under more than one year of treatment
yields z = −0.26 with p− value = 0.79.
9We have tried to deal with these effects in the framework of the
model reported in table 3. The introduction of a premium-subsample
interaction variable deals with these effects in a linear way which seems
We summarize the results obtained from the aforemen-
tioned model estimation together with some of the find-
ings reported above on Figures 4 and 5 in the following
results.
Result 3a: Gamblers and victims exhibit significantly
higher degrees of risk aversion.
Result 3b: Gamblers in the first year of treatment are
more risk averse than those in posterior years of treat-
ment, but they are attracted more than other subjects by
higher degrees of return to risk.
Result 3a is a synthesis of Results 1a and 1b, while
Result 3b can be interpreted as the consequence of some
consciously egosyntonic behavior by gamblers at an early
stage of a psychological treatment. In fact, although if
there were more observations on each treatment year it
would be interesting to fit a nonlinear model, this find-
ing indicates that the first year of treatment is special, be-
cause probably subjects in early stages of the treatment
are more concerned with their self-image as people who
are free from their pathological attraction to risky bets.
Their behavior in the lottery choice task implemented in
this study looks as if they were committed to avoid taking
risky bets, but they could not hide a secondary element of
their attraction to riskier bets when the returns to risk are
high.
Finally, we find that:
Result 4: Males are less risk-averse than females.
This result is compatible with numerous previous find-
ings on the relation between gender and risky decision-
making.10
5 Conclusions
This paper explores attitudes toward risk among two fo-
cus populations: pathological gamblers under psycholog-
not to fit the data sufficiently well.
10See for example, Byrnes et al. (1999), Harris et al. (2006) for the
case of financial risk, as well as the literature reviewed and results re-
ported by García-Gallego et al. (2005).
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Figure 5: Comparison between PGs in the first year of
treatment (top) and PGs under longer treatment (bottom)
with respect to their reactions to different risk-return pa-
rameters.
ical treatment (“addicts”) and gamblers’ relatives (“vic-
tims”). We compare these subsamples to a control pop-
ulation subsample (“normals”). Our results can be sum-
marized as follows:
• Addicts are willing to take fewer risks than normal
individuals.
• Victims are even more risk-averse than addicts and
the majority of them are unwilling to take any risk
at all.
• Both addicts and victims maintain their choices in-
variant across different scenarios of the risk-return
trade-off.
• In contrast, normals’ behavior presents the expected
pattern of choosing weakly riskier lotteries in the
presence of a higher return to risk.
There is hardly any doubt that behavior in a risky task
can be explained as the result of a strategy aiming at
what the subject sees as the best option, after uncertainty
and reward attraction-repulsion have been accounted for.
This issue has been extensively studied so far under dif-
ferent theoretical frameworks. However, our results in-
dicate that the effects of a given strategy or a decision
making task as a whole on the perception of oneself and
others (Cross et al., 2002) also matter. Gamblers who
are voluntarily under treatment exhibit a higher risk aver-
sion than normal subjects, because probably they feel that
risky bets have already cost them a lot. In fact, patho-
logical gamblers in the first year of treatment appear to
be more risk averse than normal subjects, whereas as the
number of years under treatment increase, their degrees
of risk taking approach that of normal subjects. As we
said before, this may be the result of PGs’ willingness to
present themselves as totally cured from their attraction
to risky bets. However, our results reveal a secondary
element in a PG’s behavior which should be taken into
account because it cannot be easily controlled by con-
sciously egosyntonic intentions. This element is attrac-
tion to riskier bets in the presence of higher returns to
risk. In that aspect, PGs in the first year of treatment have
exhibited the strongest attraction to more profitable risky
bets among all other subjects studied here. Furthermore,
the partners of PGs under treatment, are even more un-
willing to make risky bets, as the majority of them take
no risk at all.
Our results tend to confirm our main hypothesis. That
is, our three different subsamples behave differently in
an abstract lottery-choice task. The result concerning
the victims is consistent with the psychological literature
focused on children’s behavior living in a family where
parental gambling is a problem. However, it is not clear
how addicts would behave if real rewards were offered.
We cannot give monetary prizes to gamblers under treat-
ment, but we can do it with people who go to casinos
and are not under medical supervision. This might be an
interesting step for further research.
References
Albers, W., & Albers, G. (1983). On the prominence
structure of the decimal system. In Scholz, R. W. (Ed.),
Decision Making under Uncertainty, pp. 271–287. El-
sevier North Holland.
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Third Ed. Wash-
ington DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1980.
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Fourth Ed. Wash-
ington DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1994.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007 Pathological gambling and risk attitude 135
Battalio, R. C., Fisher, E., Kagel, J. H., Basmann, R. L.,
Winkler, R. C. & Krasner, R. (1973). A test of con-
sumer demand theory using observations of individual
consumer purchases. Western Economic Journal 11,
411–428.
Bosch-Domènech, A., Nagel, R. & Sánchez-Andrés, J.
V. (2005). Social Capabilities Preserved in Alzheimer
Patients. Working Paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D.C. & Schafer, W.D. (1999). Gen-
der differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 125, 367–383.
Cartwright, C., Decaria, C., & Hollander, E. (1998).
Pathological gambling: A clinical review. Practical
Psychiatry and Behavioral Health 4, 277–286.
Cross, S. E., Morris. M. L. & Gore, J. S. (2002).
Thinking about oneself and others: The relational-
interdependent self-construal and social cognition.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62, 399–
418.
Darbyshire, P. (2001). The experience of pervasive loss:
Children and young people living in a family where
parental gambling is a problem. Journal of Gambling
Studies 17, 23–45.
Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (in press). Men, women and
risk aversion: Experimental evidence. In C. Plott and
V. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Results.
New York: Elsevier.
Frost, R. O. (2001). Obsessive-compulsive features in
pathological lottery and scratch-ticket gamblers. Jour-
nal of Gambling Studies 17, 5–19.
Gaboury, A. & Ladouceur, R. (1989). Erroneous percep-
tions and gambling. Journal of Social Behavior and
Personality, 4, 411–420.
García-Gallego, A., Georgantzís, N., Ginés, M. &
Jaramillo, A. (2006). Gender and risk attitudes in bar-
gaining experiments. Universitat Jaume I, mimeo.
Georgantzís, N., García-Gallego, A., Sabater-Grande, G.
& Genius, M. (2004). Lottery-specific risk attitudes:
Probability and reward attraction vs. risk-return trade-
offs. Universitat Jaume I, mimeo.
Goodie, A. (2005). The role of perceived control and
overconfidence in pathological gambling. Journal of
Gambling Studies 21, 481–502.
Harris, C., Jenkins, M. & Glaser, D. (2006). Gender dif-
ferences in risk assessment: Why do women take fewer
risks than men? Judgement and Decision Making 1,
48–63.
Ladouceur, R., Arsenault, D., Freeston M.H. & Jacques,
C. (1997). Psychological characteristics of volunteers
in studies on gambling. Journal of Gambling Studies
13, 69–84.
Leopard, D. (1978). Risk preference in consecutive gam-
bling. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 4, 521–528
Murningham, J. K., Roth, A. E., & Schoumaker, F.
(1988). Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimen-
tal study. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1, 101–124.
Olsen, R. A. & Cox, C. M. (2001). The influence of gen-
der on the perception and response to investment risk:
The case of professional investors. The Journal of Psy-
chology and Financial Markets, 2, 29–36.
Pope, R. (1998). Attractions to and repulsions from
chance. In Leinfellner, W., Köhler E. (Eds.), Game
Theory, Experience, Rationality. Dordrecht: Kluwer,
95–107.
Pope, R. (2000). Evidence of deliberate violations of
dominance due to secondary satisfactions — Attrac-
tions to chance. Homo Economicus, 14, 47–76.
Roth, A. & Malouf, M. W. K. (1979). Game-theoretic
models and the role of bargaining. Psychological Re-
view 86, 574–594.
Sabater-Grande, G. & Georgantzis, N. (2002). Account-
ing for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma
games: An experimental test. Journal of Economic Be-
havior and Organization, 48, 37–50.
Stinchfield, R.,Takushi, R., Hanson, G. & Bogan, S.
(2003). A program for the treatment of pathological
gambling: Program participation and treatment out-
comes. Washington State Department of Social and
Health Services, RCW 67.70.350(5) November 1.
Toneatto, T. (1999). Cognitive distortions in heavy gam-
bling. Journal of Gambling Studies, 13, 253–266.
Toneatto, T. (1999). Cognitive psychopathology of prob-
lem gambling. Substance use and misuse, 34, 1593–
1604.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1982). Availability: A
heuristic for judging frequency and probability. In D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, pp. 163–
178. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Appendix: Instructions
Welcome to this decision-making study. This session be-
longs to a research project directed by Professors Niko-
laos Georgantzís (Universitat Jaume I) and Pablo Brañas
(Universidad de Jaén and IESA-CSIC). Identical sessions
have been run in Valencia, Castellón, Crete and Athens.
This session is going to last 15 minutes. We thank you
for your participation.
You are going to be asked to take four decisions. In the
attached sheet there are four panels [panels are in Figure
1]. Take for example the first one. In the first row (P)
you can see decimal numbers between 1 and 0.1 (both
included). These numbers represent probabilities with
which you can hypothetically earn the amount of money
shown in the cell below this number (row “Xpuntos”).
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For instance, with probability 0.6 you can earn 1.73 EUR.
Therefore, if you play this lottery:
• 60 out of 100 times you will earn 1.73 EUR
• 40 out of 100 times you will earn nothing.
However, if you look at the 0.3 cell you will see how
payoffs are different:
• 30 out of 100 times you will earn 3.56 EUR
• 70 out of 100 times you will earn nothing.
You have to choose one of the 10 lotteries offered in
this panel. You have to do the same for each one of the
other three panels.
When you are done, please fill the survey in sheet 3.
Thank you for your participation. As you can see you
do not have to write your name anywhere. This study is
completely anonymous.
